Washington rethinks its options on Iraq
21 November 2003
Washington rethinks its options on Iraq
News Analysis
From Michael Brown in Washington
November 19th, 2003 — In legislative act and promised deed the United States government announced in November its opposition to occupation. The record is clear, not once but twice.
First, with passage of the Syria Accountability Act, Congress called for an end to Syria’s “occupation of Lebanon”. Second, with the frantic manoeuvring of Paul Bremer and a Bush Administration reading the gloomy prognostications of the CIA for mounting turmoil, the US recognized the need to end the occupation of Iraq sooner rather than later.
Of course, through deft semantics Commander-in-Chief George W. Bush and Bremer believe American forces will no longer be occupiers if a sovereign Iraqi government invites them to stay, which will sound as convincing to many as Syria’s feeble protestations today that they were invited into Lebanon a quarter of a century ago by the Lebanese.
As for the occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Administration appears entirely unable to find its moral compass. For the region’s central conflict, the more things change the more they remain the same.
Time to get out
The occupation of Iraq is falling apart and Bush wants out fast. He cannot say so, but his electoral body language positively trumpets his enormous discomfort. Instead, on 14 November, he declared resolutely: “We will do whatever it takes to help Iraq develop into a free and peaceful country. That is our goal. And we will stay there until the job is done. And then we’ll leave.”
American officials have taken to saying they will not “cut and run”. It is very nearly Washington’s new mantra. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, many are desperate to draw down the number of US troops there. Military leaders freely admit the trends are not good. US forces are coming under fire with ever greater frequency.
The Administration, having skewered its predecessor for allowing the American election timetable to drive Middle East peace-making, is now doing precisely the same thing in Iraq. Bush, Karl Rove, his closest political strategist, and their cohorts seem to think what is good for their re-election prospects is good for Iraq, rather than the other way around. Desperate to show progress, they summoned Bremer to Washington for emergency consultations in mid-November and hastily reworked the schedule for Iraq to show progress and, they hope, fewer troops prior to election day next November.
The sudden scramble conveys a message of policy confusion in Baghdad and Washington. Military tumult throughout Iraq has driven this. But it has hardly been helped by the American-picked Iraqi Governing Council, which has failed until now to lead.
Washington is a clear loser in the process. Rather than appearing to be graciously speeding up the hand-over of sovereignty, the Administration looks shaken and moved to action by those shooting down its helicopters.
The occupation’s chief administrator is now on record as saying that he seeks an interim Iraqi constitution that “embodies American values”. Phrased thoughtfully, this might be reassuring. Phrased in the language of the colonial overlord, this is potential trouble and smacks of Bush’s early language of a “crusade” in his “war on terror”.
Through “caucuses” Iraq will pick a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) to be in place by the end of June 2004. Thereupon, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) are to be dissolved. The TNA will then declare sovereignty and invite the American forces to stay on as guests rather than occupiers.
Needless to say, America’s commitment to a truly fair election is already being called into question by those wondering why the new US/IGC plan still does not call for elections until the end of 2005. The Administration and the CPA will have to tread with great care in order not to give the impression of American stacking of the political deck.
Meanwhile, writing a new constitution has been pushed back until 2005. The constitutional convention preparing the document, however, will be “directly elected by the Iraqi people” (apparently as a result of sustained effort from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani rather than the US). Following ratification of the constitution, for which no specific date was set, there are to be new Iraqi elections by 31 December 2005. In contrast to the direct election by the Iraqi people of delegates to the constitutional convention, the elections for the Iraqi government in 2005 do not clearly state whether they will include all Iraq’s people or be based again on caucuses, as in 2004 for the TNA. The procedure should be determined by the constitutional convention.
Military timetable
At the same time as the rerouting of the political timetable was a reworking of the military one.
On this, American politicians are torn, and not always along party lines. Some want to get out quickly and turn security over to the Iraqis. This strategy of “Iraqification” – currently pursued by Bush – is being lambasted as a modern-day incarnation of the failed “Vietnamization” of America’s war three decades ago in Southeast Asia.
Washington insiders such as Sen. Joe Biden (Dem. De) and Sen. John McCain (Rep. Az) argue that if the US is serious about the democratization of Iraq it cannot give the appearance of bailing out; it may in fact have to add troops. They, of course, open themselves to criticism of getting sucked into Iraq just as Lyndon B. Johnson was in Vietnam. Americans desperate to exorcise the Vietnam spectre seem condemned to argue endlessly over the lessons of that war and whether or not they are applicable to the vastly different milieu of Iraq.
One option not available in Vietnam is to turn matters over to the United Nations. The Administration is loath to do so, however, after flouting the UN throughout the build-up to war. Moreover, as Dilip Hiro points out in the New York Times, it is not clear that Iraqis would look on the UN that oversaw sanctions with any more kindness than many view armed American forces.
Consequently, the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization may be better situated to provide security and policing assistance. They would be better received by Iraqi civilians, though the matter would have to be handled with the utmost care so that contributing governments were not made out to be stooges or collaborators of the American occupation.
Yet, despite the care brought to bear, such denigration would be a likely outcome. More likely still is that the Bush Administration would simply rule out the idea before it came anywhere close to implementation.
All the alternatives, then, seem fraught with one peril or another. Such is the outcome when war is waged without the explicit endorsement of the UN and while belittling at every turn the very nations that could have helped later. Nevertheless, the least bad of all the constitution and security options would seem to be a combined effort from the United Nations, Arab League, and Islamic Conference.
One of the drawbacks of the new plan is that it still does not open the door to the UN and other parts of the international community to lend meaningful help and expertise.
As of mid-November Iraq is a mess – one senses a staunch determination not to call it a quagmire – and one that could very well cost Bush a second term. If he remains more wedded to the November elections than to getting Iraq right, then other rapidly embraced decisions could be on the way. Working Iraq out on the fly will only reinforce the perception that the Administration failed to prepare adequately for the day after the war was won.
This current redirection, it should be noted, is not Bush’s first. Bremer’s presence itself is the result of an earlier shift away from retired General Jay Garner. The lack of American preparation noted then is once again being cited today.
Champion of democracy
Early November also witnessed the ongoing shift in reasons for the war with Iraq. On 6 November Bush addressed the National Endowment for Democracy and made the case that “60 years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East” were over, as this “did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty”.
It could have been a fine moment if Bush had honestly grappled with the fact that from the undermining of Mossadeq in Iran onwards the United States has played a role in shoring up some of the most unsavoury regimes. Instead, Bush insulted the intelligence of both Americans and prospective listeners in the region by praising the feints toward democratic representation by allies while blasting nations less well liked, despite some tentative democratic steps of their own. For the people of the region the address probably confirmed the sentiment that Bush will only back democracy in the Middle East as long as the outcome is to his liking. Yaser Arafat, more openly chosen than any one of the regimes encouraged by Bush, clearly is one outcome abhorred by his Administration.
It is now clear that another outcome not to Bush’s liking was the possibility of standing down from war with Iraq. His Administration was dead set on war and not interested in exploring proffered ways out. New evidence brought to light by James Risen in the New York Times indicates that the administration rejected a possible back-channel arrangement being offered by Saddam Hussein. Quite simply, like his father who snubbed the all-out peace-making effort of King Hussein 13 years earlier, George W. Bush, Richard Perle and others preferred war.
Sidney Blumenthal in the Guardian, meanwhile, asserted that an eminently more trustworthy secret emissary, Khalil Shiqaqi representing Mahmud Abbas, was seen by the Administration but given no help whatsoever in response to his plea that they lean on Sharon to help shore up the new Palestinian prime minister. Shiqaqi claimed the Administration stated that assistance could not be rendered because of domestic political constraints.
There are, however, tentative signs that the administration may be aware it will have to help Ahmad Quray more than Abbas. One Palestinian official went so far as to claim the Administration’s troubles in Iraq were driving it to seek positive news from Israel and Palestine – a far cry from the Administration’s contention prior to the war that success in Iraq would constrain the Palestinians and lead them (broken) to the negotiating table.
In an interview with the BBC before his trip to London, where he arrived for a state visit on 18 November, Bush said: “I believe it is in Israel’s interest that there be a peaceful Palestinian state. And I know it’s in the Palestinians’ interest. However, to achieve a peaceful Palestinian state, the emergence of a peaceful Palestinian state, a state where people are willing to risk capital, a place where people are willing to develop an economy, there must be a focused effort to defeat terror. And there hasn’t been with the current Palestinian leadership.”
Bush can rehash the failings of Palestinian leadership but can offer no creative way to move the process forward. But there are some in his Administration slowly – agonizingly slowly – growing frustrated with the intransigence of Ariel Sharon and the new settlement tenders now being offered in the West Bank. For one, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice again went on the record expressing concern about the Wall in the West Bank. There is no loud public push from the Administration, but cease-fire plans are again stirring in the region.
